WarCult and Peace Ethic:The Ambivalent Relationship between Christianity and War
Nowadays,atthe beginningofthe 21 st Century, the horizon to discuss theproblem of religion and warhas completely changed.
1 Theend of the cold war, 9/11, the fear of Islamist terror in Europesgreat cities,and the ideological inhumanity of the IS-regimei nI raq and Syria raked the anxiety conjoined to the notiono fa clash of civilisations.F rom the 1970s till 1989, the peacemovements in Europe and America requested the contribution of religion, especially Christianity,t o overcome the conflict of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, claiming nuclear disarmament and remonstratingmilitary stockpile.Since then, the idea of religion in this function being as ource of violentf undamentalism has gained increasing approval. Many adherents to western culture receive the impression that monotheism in itself -beitChristian, Muslim or Jewish -isdensely connected to the legitimation of war and terror.T herefore,the history of religious wars in Christianity up to George Bushs"war on terror"isread and interpretedasavariant but corresponding version of modernIslamist radicalization.
But war theories circulating in the Christian tradition and in Christianity today are in no way limitedt op redominantly religiously motivated military conflicts that are identified with the concepts "religious war" or even "holy war."Instead, these theoriesa re concernedi ng eneral with Christian religion in all forms and types of war, 2 as it has informed the Westslong and violent military history.The predominantly legitimizing function of Christianity in war is agreed upon by historically interested contemporaries:Ministers and pastors bless the weapons and declare the war goals of attackers or defenders as right and good. Furthermore,they express Godspartisanship textually and ritually and promote the continuation of this or that outbreak of the next war as political practice with military means.
However, ar eligious-historical comparison with pre-Christian and nonChristian religions reveals the narrowness of such commonp reconceptions, because Christianity had to carry ambivalence into its confrontations withthe reality of war. Both in the cultures of the ancient Orient and in Greek-Roman realms of power, the cult of religious war remained intimately connected with political authority and military control.
3 Due to Christianity having aligned itself with the narrative of the people of Israel and the early Judaic tradition in the Hebrew bible, and as this history of Israel cannot be isolatedfrom, but must rather be considered in relation to the history of the people and empire building in the ancient Orient, the specifically Christianaspect has to be clarified in comparison to precedingand neighboring cultures.
Bible and Antiquity
In the early Oriental and ancient environments in which Christianity arose,n o other religions -e xcept Judaism and ancient philosophy 4 -h ad sophisticated perspectiveso nw ar. There was no priesthood that might represent an independentpoint of view in any of these cultures (Babylon,Assur, Egypt et al.) . Te mples were built by royal decree,and temple cults served the wellbeing of the king and his militarysuccess.Priests and attendants of the cults declared the king chosenbyGod and maintained closecompanywith royalty through careful ritual sacrifice and dreaminterpretation. These cults did not provide spiritualguidance, ethic counselingorsermons; in general, they had no independent prophets.These were appointees of the king,s uch as the priests of sacrifice, seers,a nd dream interpreters.They all viewed the king as an executive of Godswill or as equal to the gods,and supported him as such.They predicted victory and the downfallof the enemy. They carried cultici mages into battle.T hey celebrateds uccess and archived the cover-ups of losses.
5 Cult priests saw no missionary intention in these wars.The gods of other kings were considered to exist, though viewed as obviously less powerful. So they were integrated into their own polytheist pantheon under their own chief god. Therefore, there were no holy wars intending to annihilate inferior rituals.W arsw ere fought over resources:f or expansion of lordship,f or servile subjects and tribute,for looting weapons and slaves,wood, oil, wine,orfor 3H olzem,Andreas: "Geistliche im Krieg und die Normen des Kriegsverstehens:Ein religionsgeschichtliches Modell zu Ritual, Ethik und Trost zwischen militärischer Kulttradition und christlicher Friedenspflicht", in:Brendle,Franz /Schindling, Anton (eds.): Geistliche im Krieg, Münster 2009, 41-85. 4C f. Groß,W alter, "Keine Heiligen Kriege in Israel. Zur Rolle JHWHsi n Kriegsdarstellungen der Bücher Josb is 2Kön", in:H olzem, Andreas (ed.): Krieg und Christentum:R eligiöse Gewalttheorien in der Kriegserfahrung des Westens (Krieg in der Geschichte,V ol. 50), Paderborne ta l. 2009, 107-127. Erler, Michael, "Ursachenanalyse von Krieg und Frieden bei Platon und in der hellenistischen Philosophie",i n: Holzem,A ndreas (ed.): Krieg und Christentum:R eligiöse Gewalttheorien in der Kriegserfahrung des Westens (Krieg in der Geschichte,V ol. 50), Paderborn et al. 2009, 169-179 . 5S tietencron, Heinrich von:"Töten im Krieg:Grundlagen und Entwicklungen", in: Ders.(ed.): Töten im Krieg, Freiburg et al. 1995, 17-53; 34-41. passaget oa no cean. This explains the general difference in the tendency of Israelsw ar tales:T he flight from Egypt and the periods of settlementa nd the Judges support an evaluation of the JHWH culta sh aving am ilitant,v iolenceaffirming,and violence-prone stance -inline with the adjacent cultures,but with one substantial difference:the idea of the impurity of all other religionsasastep on Israelslong way to monotheism. These texts give acentral role to divine action in war:J HWH may bringt he enemy within Israelsr each and thus bringa bout victorythrough his wondrous intervention. In exchange,however, he demands the complete annihilation of the enemy,n ot only of the warriors,b ut of all people, animals and plunder to avoid contact witht heir contaminant ways of worship (cf.1Sam 15; Dtn 20, (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) .
Thereafter,Israel underwent essential religious-historical development:Inthe Hebrewb ible as early as the late Kingdomp eriod, ap rophecya rose that was criticalofking and war, reachingaclimax with Amos and Hosea. Theexilic-postexilic (dtn-dtr) treatment of historical material as adeuteronomistic (dtr) interpretation attempted to explain the fall of Israel and the Babylonian exile. Therefore,the Hebrew bible drew on texts that were very critical of royalty,texts that did not suppressnarratives of war losses.Insteadthe bible has atone that is jealousofGodsconcern for keeping the covenant betweenJHWHand his chosen people (Ex 19, (3) (4) (5) (6) Ex24) . Unlike the narratives of the early Oriental tradition, the downfall was not provoked by Godspowerlessness,but by the peoples-and particularly the rulers-consistentviolation of thecovenant minutes (cf. Jes9, [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] 43, [27] [28] . Many of the reports of Israelsconquer of and settling in Canaan, including the elimination of the local population (Num 21,3;Dtn 2,34; Dtn 3,6;D tn 7,2;J os 2,10;J os 6,17-21;J os 10,1;J os 10,28-43;J os 11,1-23), are nowadays interpreted as ar etrospective construction by this deuteronomistic schoolinsisting on strict monotheism.The Old Te stament thus attempts to explain violentnarratives of extreme militaryloss as Godspunishment for the defiance of religious commandments.The cult priests linked to the kings of Israel and the first Jerusalem temple were history themselves,when this schooloftheologiansbegan to construe the religious interpretation of Israelswar history.
Christianitysr elation to war was ambiguous from the start. It was initially a religion far from the pillars of the Roman state.Jesus himself was denouncedby the Romanauthorities for blasphemy and instigatinguproar;and the missionaries and founders of Christian communities were executed for repudiating Romes religious traditions.The commandment to love thy neighbor (Mt 5, (38) (39) (40) (41) (42) (43) (44) (45) (46) (47) (48) , an absolute basic concept of the earliest records of Jesus-tradition 6 ,conflicted with any aggressive interpretation of the relationship to God (cf.Lev 5). The Corpus Paulinum aligned itself with the ancient Christianr eality as subject to ap agan authority,b ut refused to participate in its polytheistic cults (Rom 13). The apocalypse predicted massive battles of transcendent powers and the extermination of Godsenemiesinthe End of Days brought about by God (Rev 18/ 20), but these visions were written down not to justify force but to comfort and strengthen helplessly marginalizedC hristianc ongregations. 7 Thei nterpretation of Jesus renunciation of violence all the way to the cross posed ac hallenge: Originally,this was asubversive sign against the brutality of rulers.Only centuries later, Christss uffering was to be seen as openingaspecial way of succession: Believers takingpart in awar were invited to imagine this threat to their life as a sacrifice equal to Jesus. Therefore,t he early Christians relation to war wasd ouble-edged:F irstly, Christian theology in late antiquity took as its central themenot an interpretation of war, but an ethicofpeace.Christianity had to be interpretedasapplicable to issues of political andmilitary responsibility.Lactantius, Ambrosius,and particularly Augustine did not ruleo ut war completely,b ut laid out the first rational criteria for its necessity 8 :war must serve to overcome inaequitas (inequity) and neglect of iustitia (justice)a nd lex aeterna (eternal law). Thus in actuality,t hey developed the distinction between ius ad bellum (right to war) and ius in bello (law in war) as well as characteristics of their implementation through ratio (reason) and sapientia (wisdom). Augustine saw passion dominate reasoni nw ar;i nt he Christian interpretation, this was aconsequence of mansfall into sin, and of the destruction this incidence left in creation and in humankindsm ind. Following pre-Christian philosophy,A ugustine contended that the desire to rule (libido dominandi)and the desire to harm others (libido ulciscendi)were weaknessesin the inner unity of the human being. Because atruly Christian orderofsocietyruled by iustitia, caritas and clementia -was assessed as impossible after the fall into sin, state penal powers had to keep judicial order. The"righteous war" was limited to an outpouring of state efforts to establish order, and Augustine did not dispute that mostwars of the RomanEmpire would thus be considered unjust. At the samet ime,A ugustine argued that the Donatists of North Africa, whose suppression he claimed, should be persecuted not because of their differing beliefs,but because of their tendency towards violence against the community and against the true religion. To oblige them to attendthe servicesofthe true church (compelle intrare,cf. Lk 14,23) would, he assumed, reconvert them to the righteous doctrine and peaceful behavior.T he "doctrine of peace"t hat can be read 7N icklas,T obias:"Der Krieg und die Apokalypse:Gedanken zu Offb 19,11-21", in: Holzem,A ndreas (ed.): Krieg und Christentum:R eligiöse Gewalttheorien in der Kriegserfahrung des Westens (Krieg in der Geschichte,V ol. 50), Paderborn et al. 2009, 150-165; 150 from Augustinestexts saw no role for priests in battle,because war was closeto incompatible with divinity.T he principle pacem pace non bello (peace through peace and not through war) is the true maxim of Augustinesethics of peace.
9 This meant that an interventioninwar by clerics was essentially unthinkable.
During the Middle Ages,however, the perspective of reading Augustine had shifted:Intheir eyes,the church fathersinterpretation of the Roman emperors targets shed lightontheir own self-understanding of being aChristian warriorlike Constantine.T his emphasis on war instead of peacew as intensified by the Old Te stamentsrole model of beingaking under Godseyes:The biblical texts were largelyi nterpreted as historically true reports about virtuous rulers.T he strong beliefsofmilitaryleaders and kings held sway alongside abelief in the assistance of JHWH in victory.T hus Augustine had laid the parameters for later justifications of wars against "idolaters" and "heretics". Declaring the emperor and the European kings as pious rulers in the service of God, violencebecame explainable as the will of God particularly against the Catharists and Muslims.A ugustines few, restrictiveconcessions to the option of "just" war were later expanded to the basis of as ystematic war ethic. This remained valid in moral theological handbooks into the 20 th century.The questionswere therefore:How does war fit into Christian life,h ow can it be reconciled with the will of God, how can Christian societies come to terms withthe manifoldideas of Godsactions in history and the human sufferings in their aftermath, and whatclericalaid -byeither motivation or consolation -isacceptable in the effort to construe ameaning of death as well as survival?But it was seldomasked how holding Christianbeliefs should limit war. This is the first side: the bible,ancient Christiantheology and war, including the tendencies of its further developments.
On the other hand, despite this ambivalence in their holy scriptures and in the ethics of war, during the late antiquity,Christians integrated themselves surprisingly smoothly into the Roman army.T he bibler eports the earliest Christian military service.S ince state and earthly order must be provisionally accepted, even soldiers were allowed in Christian religious communities (cf.Mk5par;Mt8 par;L k3;A cts 10). They were probably able to avoid participation in pagan rituals excepti np hases of persecution of Christians directed by the regional or centralgovernments of the Roman Empire.
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With Constantinesv ictorya tthe MilvianBridge, the Christian God was engaged for the first time to aid in battle.The reasoning behind this event was from the pagan cult-theory of "the stronger god."Clerics were not present at the battle 9C f. Weissenberg, Friedenslehre, [176] [177] Cf.Brennecke, Hanns Christoph, "Kriegsdienst und Soldatenberuf fürChristen und die Rolle des römischenHeeres fürdie Mission", in:Holzem,Andreas (ed.): Krieg und Christentum:R eligiöse Gewalttheorien in derK riegserfahrung des Westens (Krieg in der Geschichte,V ol. 50), Paderborn et al. 2009, 180-211. according to the report by EusebiusofCaesarea.
11 They came into play only later in ordertoenable interpretation of this war in the classical schemeofdivineaid. Thus af ar-reaching model appeared:T op revent archaic violencei nh uman communities ripewith conflict, aChristian variantofthe "legitimation to kill as a specific correlate of power" 12 was thought to be necessary.A fter 312 CE, Constantine went beyond placingthe Christian monogram he had seen in the vision at the MilvianBridgeonthe shields of his warriors,onhis military standard (labarum), and on his helmet. Towards the end of his reign, Christian priests were present in imperial armies.The first weapon blessings with this XR-symbolwere added, andc amps included prayer tents,b ishops,a nd military chaplains. The religious needs of the Roman armyt ransferred from paganism to an oath of allegiance to the trinity, Christian laws,p rayers,c rosses,i cons,a nd liturgies stepped into the army as well as aChristianized imperial cult,all withoutmuch modificationofthe pagan concepts of understanding the role of religion in wartimes.I ndirectly,e mperors continued the Roman tradition established in the Republican Period:Decisions about waroutcomes were laid into the hands of the gods.Inpre-Christian periods, bellumiustum (just war)depended especially on influencing the Gods with ar itually correct cult. This ancient theory of bellum iustum had nothingt od ow ith ethical categories of justice.C hristianc lerics adopted this concept,amalgamatingitwith the completely different approachof the patristic theologians:Sothey did what pagan priests had done for the army before them to emphasize the armysdependence on divine powers.Additionally, Christianitysr ich reservoir of rituals could also deliver imperial style in war.
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In order to gain ab alanced perspective of early Christiand evelopments,the religious-political contrast betweent he theologiansr estrictive war ethic and a parallel, seemingly unproblematic transfer of pre-Christian military cults should be noted. TheC hristianizationo fa rmy and war since late antiquity provided clerics with two positions representing two sets of demandsthat were difficult to reconcile and that had systems of rulesbased on differing responsible parties:on the one side were theologians and biblical hermeneutics and on the other side were prayersofinvocationand "sacrifice". Christianity was therefore always as free as it was forcedt oconsider its options between these poles and to provide political advice basedonsuch considerations. Its representatives also had to both adhere to and wanttoprovide such spiritual weapons which had descendedfrom 11 Cf.EusebiusofCaesarea: Vita Constantini 1,29;in: De Vita Constantini, ed. Bruno Bleckmann /Horst Schneider (Fontes Christiani 83), Tu rnhout 2007, 184-197. 12 Stietencron, Töten, 34-35 . 13 Meier, Mischa:"Der christliche Kaiser zieht (nicht) in denKrieg: Religionskriege in der Spätantike?", in:Holzem,Andreas (ed.): Krieg und Christentum:Religiöse Gewalttheorien in der Kriegserfahrung des Westens( Krieg in der Geschichte,V ol. 50), Paderborn et al. 2009, 254-278; 260. political religions of the ancientOrient and the pre-Christian Mediterranean. This in turn createdamultitude of ambiguities and ethical problems.
The Middle Ages
In the Middle Ages,the Christianjustification for war basedonAugustinespeace theory -g iven the unsurpasseda uthority of this church father -h eld ground substantially,b ut was adjusted to the new realities of war:N either the Carolingiansnor the Ottonians declaredtowage "holy" missionary warstoviolently expand Christianity among Saxons and Slavs. Theprevailing connectionbetween war and mission was based on apattern of justification that interpreted political unpredictability and barbarian savagerya sp agan religious trademarks.T he Christianization could thus appear as ameans for political civilizing.
14 During the High Middle Ages,especially the Treuga Dei (Peaceand Truce of God) was no blessing upon war actions,but acampaigntopacify western Christianity ad extra (against the expansion of Islam) and ad intra (against the permanenta ristocraticf euds destroyingl ands and churches). Of course, all these wars were based on the idea that taking up the Christianfaith was essential for the consolidation of aviolence-free space and that Christian rulers andChurch representativeshad the task of protection and jurisdiction in carrying out this idea. Therefore,t he theory emerged that war could be engaged in by ordero ft he Church and with the Churchsauthority.T his sort of war should be salutary for participants, under the precondition of the warriorsright intention:toreinstate peace,toprotect the church, to avoid unjust iniquitiesand eliminateany avarice and hate out of his heart. This was pure Augustinism. Due to the emperor-and every ruler in general -being appointed to protect not only secularorder, but also the Church and the true faith, the substantially defensive basis of ethical reflections on war in Christian theology could be convertedi nto an offensive strategyinthese contexts.Securing the Treuga Dei,the fight for Church reform, the crusades against the harassmentofChristian pilgrims in the Muslim world, as well as the support of heretics,g ained curative qualities for the salvation of the Christian knighthood, in terms of at heology of repentance and redemption. Nevertheless, the sources for the crusades use the term bellum sacrum/sanctum as little as the collections of canonic law and moral theology through to Thomas Aquinas.F urthermore,t he crusades were justified as aw ar for the "defense of Christianity against the threat of Muslim powers and in order to regain formerly 14 Körntgen, Ludger:"Heidenkrieg und Bistumsgründung: Glaubensverbreitung als Herrscheraufgabe bei Karolingern und Ottonen",in: Holzem, Andreas(ed.): Krieg und Christentum:R eligiöse Gewalttheorien in der Kriegserfahrung des Westens (Krieg in der Geschichte,V ol. 50), Paderborn et al. 2009, 281-304; 281. Christian areas". 15 In this sense,the indulgence promulgated by pope Urban II as ap art of the crusades propaganda was not ac ollective romanticization of war waging knights as martyrs-although the crusaders mostly saw themselves as such -b ut the indulgencies wereu nderstood as individual commutations of penance.The beneficialvalue of participationshould be preconditioned as long as the campaignsucceeded as "solely devotional (prosola devotione)."
On the other hand, participants in crusades createdtheir own religious logic, which was difficult to reconcile with reflections from Augustine through Gratian to Thomas Aquinas. Amongcrusaders and then among people including the pope who celebrated their victory in 1099 abelief in the pollutio (pollution)ofholy sites by the Muslim conquerorsw as at work, for whicha na toningp urificationw as achieved through the bloodshed of the supposed offenders:The massacre of the inhabitants of Jerusalem in 1099w as sanctified as the violent wrath of God himself.The crusaders believed that the holy siteshad to be expurgated from the stain of Muslim cultic practices.T exts of the Hebrewb ible -a st hose analyzed above -that were originally applied to themes of blaming Israel, infidelity against the covenant and divinef ate were now considered analogous paradigms of violence in the name of God. Between theological questions of justice and cultic blood vengeance,akind of "negative compromise" had emerged. 16 In wars taking place in the West against alleged enemies of the true faith, particularly in the Albigensian Wara gainst heretics in Southern France,t hese theories gained their own historyofreception. TheChristian faith, according to the indisputablec onsensus,c ould not be violently propagated and had to be accepted freely.But as is often commonplace,tocircumvent this basic theological assumption people,o nce baptized and Christianized, could sometimes even be forced (corporaliter compellere)t oc omply to the assumed faith and stick to its ethicalobligations and liturgicalpractices. HereAugustinesposition towards the Donatist Schism provided authority even in wars against heretics.T he Albigensianc rusade was completely ineffective in the search for Cathar perfecti (apostles) and credenti (supporters) or in coping with the widespread religious syncretism. Instead, the war was preceded by another declared goal:A llegedly illegitimate rulers who did not fight the heresy were to be replaced with principes catholici (princes loyal to the Catholic Church). Thecondemnation of enemies of the faith as peace breakers and the kings responsibility to protectthe church to evade Godswrath derived essentially from the concept of aChristian empire in late antiquity and of afaithful kingship in the Carolingian and Ottonian periods; the Treuga Dei was intended to bind the local noblemen in honor and assigned the leadership for the whole process to the church authorities:t he pope and his legates. Hence,t he spectrumo fj ust reasonsf or war was -a ccording to the situation in south-westFrance during the 12 th and 13 th centuries -expanded again to include"the replacement of local and territorial rulers who condoned hereticism with Catholic aristocrats." 17 Nonetheless,from alegal and theological perspective, this was not an escalation to as anctified divine war,i tw as aw ell expected opportunity to integrate the hitherto independent south into the realm of the French kingdom. Being declared as ac ampaign to defend the church, it was covered with papal indulgencies as the crusades to Jerusalem or the Reconquista in Spain.
Thehistory of medieval war theory accounts argumentatively for aprocess of a permanent re-interpretation of just war-ideas; holy war was not at all acentral term in these debates,itwould occur later and under different preconditions.In fact, the specifically religious reasons for just war steadily expandedu pt ot he severe and heated debates in 15 th and 16 th centuries Spain on the inhuman colonization and Christianizationo ft he so called NewI ndies in Latin America. Erasmus of Rotterdam was the first to criticize war as destructionofthe divine order of creationand damage to state,society,and economyinhis early humanist text Dulce bellum inepertis 18 ,but in the face of confessional conflict erupting in Imperial Germany and the Turkish threat in the Southeast, even Erasmus considered it necessarytorelativize the ethical primacy of atotal Christianpacifism.
The Early Modern Period
Theconfessional conflictsthat dominated the early modern period constituted a multi-layered challenge for the Christian formation of war theory.E ven more than the Middle Ages,t he confessionalw ars of Europese arly modern period were assessed to be the parade groundfor bloodthirsty fanaticized religion, since the Europeane nlightenmentm ovements began to criticize confessional orthodoxies of all sorts.The discreteness of the political sphere, the emancipation from 17 Oberste,Jörg:"Krieg gegen Ketzer?Die defensores,receptatores und fautores von Ketzern und die principesc atholici in der kirchlichenR echtfertigung des Albigenserkriegs", in:H olzem, Andreas (ed.): Krieg und Christentum:R eligiöse Gewalttheorien in der Kriegserfahrung des Westens( Krieg in der Geschichte,V ol. 50), Paderborn et al. 2009, 368-391; 386. 18 Cf.E rasmus von Rotterdam:" Dulceb ellum inexpertis", in:A dagia (Nr. 3001). Opera omnia Desiderii ErasmiRoterodami. Recognita et adnotatione critica instructa notisque illustratae, Bd. 2,7, Amsterdam /Heidelberg 1999, 11-44. religious authorities and the claim to control and domesticate fanaticism and extremism;a ll of these elements consideredt ypical for modernW estern selfunderstanding can be considereda sc onsequences drawn from war experiences during the era of confessionalism.
Christian theory development, which was authoritative for political decisions, interpretivem odels and war experiences of protagonists in the 16 th and 17 th centuries,was once again in no way aunilineal process matching thesesubsequent apodictic judgments.M artinL uthersT wo Kingdoms resp. Tw oG overnments Doctrine,apart of which is applicable for militaryi nterpretation, was af irst attempt to subtly differentiate areas of worldly law and agencyfrom areas within which God related to human beings.T his doctrine must be understood as an enhancement from medieval political theory and not as areversalthereof.Inone decisiverespect aboundary is set for any secularauthority:Ithas no authorization to intervene in the interpretation of the Gospel, although Luther had to concede that the shaping of new protestant church orders could not be established without extensive influence of the civil authorities.Inanother respect, Luther assessedthe (hitherto papal and episcopal) influence as an abuse of clerical power in the political orderofthe German princes realms. Thus he opened apolitical playing field, whereinp roclamations of ecclesiastical powerw ere no longer legitimate. The terrena civitas,Luther was convinced, is not to be ruledbythe Gospel:Here the secular authority has autonomous penal powertorepel the devilsefforts to destroy the societal order of Christianity. As important as the Tw oKingdomsDoctrine was for any theory of the state in early modernity,italso had ablind side.Inthe case of the German Peasants War, war theoryi nt he Lutheran formulation lost its affiliation to practicalm oral philosophy and moral theology,w hich it had held sincel ate antiquity and throughout the whole of the MiddleAges,and which it would maintain in Catholic Baroque Scholasticism in the early modern period.T he political autonomy of seculara uthorities could hardly be countered, since for Luther "the deciding theme was not the form of authority,but the necessity for control of human evil".
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TheT wo Kingdom Doctrine thus supported, but did not control, the military aspect of nation building.
Thedebate developed differently in the reformed nationsofSwitzerland and England. TheReformation in Zurich and Geneva wanted to shape the world using the norms of the Gospel. "What differentiates the Zwinglian and Calvinist Churches [is] the claim that the Kingdom of Christi setiam externum".
20 In ac-cordance with the covenant theology from the Old Te stament, authority had to actively secure the true faithand help expand the Kingdom of Christonearth. The justification for this lay not in the conventional responsibility of Church protection as debated in the Middle Ages,b ut in the reception of deuteronomistic historical theology:Ar uler and their peoplew ho injure the conditions of the covenant will be punished by God in heaven withd efeat in war, exile and banishment from worldhistory.Inthis context, the concept of "holy war" appeared for the first time in reformed war theology. It justified atruly Christian peoples right to disobedience and civil war against tyrannical rulers.T he persecution of the reformedfaith -for exampleinthe Habsburg Netherlands or in France -was interpreted as the most specific form of unjustified violence. On the otherhand, in "patriarchalGermanprincipalities integrated in the state order of the Holy Roman Empire" 21 ,t he phenomenon of dissimulation of religious war and religious justification for violence was prevalent in both large confessions.The wars that had occurred in the Empire because of differences of faith were explained by the emperor as the executionofthe orderofLandfrieden (public peace), broken by the protestant princes, and vice versa by those princesas legal defense of their constitutionally guaranteed freedom against imperial absolutismi nq uestions of conscience.T ot ake the long view,t he dissimulation of religious war provedtobeamotorofjuridification (Verrechtlichung) of politics and military independently of questions of religious truth. An essential consequence of German peace and constitutional orders after1648 was the exclusion of religion from the concept of just war. Thec onflictb etween increasing multinationalism in the European system of power and the old universal concepts of Christianitas (Christianity), Imperium (Empire), or Monarchia universalis (universal monarchy) played as much of arole as the internal establishment of states that were undertaken as an emancipatory dissolution of greater,c ross-national alliances.I nt his process,t he state tried to take control over religion, while the bearers of religion continued to argue the supremacy of religious arguments for rulers political decision-making.
It was decisivef or the development of the relationship between Christianity and warinthe early modernperiodthat the observationthat theoretical organization and moral evaluations of war did not break down only along confessional lines,but also according to the place of debateinsociety.After the peace treaty of Augsburg 1555, the Emperors and the Imperialprinces no longermobilizedthe medieval righto fd efeating heresy as aw ar theory. Butt his differed from the erfahrung des Westens (Krieg in der Geschichte,Vol. 50), Paderborn et al. 2009, 415-438; 415 . 21 Brendle,F ranz:" Der Religionskrieg und seine Dissimulation.D ie Verteidigung des wahren Glaubens im Reich des konfessionellen Zeitalters", in:H olzem, Andreas (ed.): Krieg und Christentum:R eligiöse Gewalttheorien in derK riegserfahrung des Westens (Krieg in der Geschichte,V ol. 50), Paderborn et al. 2009, 457-469; 457. assessments made in many academic faculties of theology on both sides, in the religious orders,and in the majority of public opinion that developed powerfully after the Reformation:H ere,t he religious war wasareality up until 1648, expected and feared,publicly fought and suffered. 22 Thejuridification and nationalization of war disregardedthis duringthe early modern period, drawing instead on post-confessional theories of state,o nd ebates of natural rights,a nd on the Enlightenment.
ASketch of Christian WarTheories in the Wake of Modern WarIdeologies
During the Cabinet Wars of the 18 th century, the military was increasingly nationalized. In the process,rulers authority for interpretingand organizing also the religious aspects of war grew steadily.A ny religious service in the armies underwent strict control by military regimes and their focused aim:motivating men to fight and die.
On the other hand, after 1789 this nationalization of war was overrun with radicalizing forms of political awareness:concepts and myths about "the people" and "the nation". These new ideologies had the greatest influence during the wars triggered by the Frenchr evolution and its combatants,a nd afterwards the Napoleonic wars.T he nation in itself wasesteemed as asecularized holiness;patriotism provoked new forms of quasi-religious enthusiasm. Those motives of Christian war ethicst hat fenced off and limited war were as lost as its secular remainders in public international law,established after 1648. Instead, aprocess of anti-secularization set in, encouraging the peoples and nations to establish an overwhelming political transcendencefor which new forms of cult were created. Forthe relationship between war and Christianity in European modernity,these political-ideological sacralizations of peoples,n ations and sometimes the revolution itself brought about ambivalent consequences.S tarting with the revolutionary wars, but throughoutthe whole of the 19 th and 20 th centuries,Christianity was forcedtoconfront and meanwhile integrate this new sacralization of politics. Wargained something holy precisely in this context of aquasi-religious,political transcendence. 23 Everywhere,m odern Christianity had to comment on political religiosity as it grew more and more dominant as asource of meaning. Bishopsand theologians could not avoid supporting this evolution of enthusiastic ideologies with Christian explanations.M eanwhile,t hey adhered to alternative traditions that interpreted war as acalamity of Godspunishment,asacall to penance for individual and collective sins and as ac atharsis of modern, post-revolutionary societies to purify their liberal, disbelieving culture.T he Churches regarded modernwar as amissionary field,because war stirred the routines of irreligious lifestyles up and irritated religious neglect with the threat of an untimely death of masses.I ns hort:W ar offered an opportunity to speak about collective responsibility and individual con-or reversion. Theindividual "sacrifice" of every soldierslife was considered part of atonement for acollective sin, identified with the spiritual shortcomings of modern society.T he leadingv oice did not critically question war, but spoke of readiness to make oblations. In the greater Europeana nd American denominations,n one of thesec onventional war theories as they were applied to the situationofmodern mass wars survived May 8, 1945 . Certainly,the consequences of this long debate about war and Christianity shouldnot be overlooked:Christian war ethics required justification for both ius ad bellum and ius in bello and condemned excessiveviolence both generally and in individual cases.Christianity has held fast to the basic idea that war is not an elevated form of existence,b ut one of the most horrific consequences of sin. Conversely,itmay hardly be claimed that the increasing secularization of the political world has considerably fosteredpeace. Thesecular law of nations rests,rather, in its essential basis on the fruits of Christian thought about war ethics.
Only after the Second World War, under the banner of the Cold War, the atomic arms race and the international proxywars in Korea, Vietnam,and Africa, abroad debate began in Europeand North America about the prospects of peace in international political institutions and processes.Parallel to this,the first serious and numerically important Christian peace movements were established. Since then, the question of Christian war theory has been posed completely differently; these debatestake leave of the old concepts,mentalities and rituals.Instead, they emphasize an alternative idea of Godspartiality:God can no longer be imagined as partial to this or that warring party who claim just reasons for their own campaign. Recently challenged anew by the problemo fm ilitary crisis interventions in collapsing states,i ng enocides and against Islamist terror groups, Christianity in the 21 st centuryhas had to reflect the basic idea that God cannot remainneutral in the face of mass killings and hardship deaths.The vast majority of Christians today formulate Godspartiality differently;they postulate Gods engagementasfor humanelife for all people,following the focus of contemporary Bible reception. Out of this,t he fundamental questiona rises of how such a Vergleich (Schriftendes Historischen Kollegs.Kolloquien, Bd. 78), München 2008, 1-30; 7. theologically basico ption may be formulated and transferred into political processes so that the Augustine pacificus esse (peaceful existence) of Christianity may gain new credibility.
